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ON THE RENTAL OF PRICE OF CAPITAL AND THE PROFIT RATE 




This paper considers the implications of the conceptual difference between the rental price of 
capital, embedded in the neoclassical cost identity (output equals the cost of labor plus the cost of 
capital), and used in growth accounting studies; and the profit rate, which can be derived from the 
national income and product accounts (NIPA). The neoclassical identity is a “virtual” identity in 
that it depends on a series of assumptions (constant returns to scale and perfectly competitive 
factor markets). The income side of the NIPA also provides an accounting identity for output as 
the sum of the wage bill plus the surplus. This identity, however, is a “real” one, in the sense that it 
does not depend on any assumption and thus it holds always. It is shown that because the 
neoclassical cost identity and the income accounting identity according to the NIPA are formally 
equivalent expressions, estimations of aggregate production functions and growth accounting 
studies are tautologies. Likewise, the test of the hypothesis of competitive markets using Hall’s 
(1988) framework gives rise to a null hypothesis that cannot be rejected statistically. 
 
Keywords: aggregate production function, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 








In a series of papers, Felipe and McCombie (see the references) have revived and 
considerably extended the criticism of the aggregate production function put forward 
some years ago by, inter alios, Shaikh (1974, 1980), Simon, (1979a, 1979b), and 
serendipitously by Samuelson (1979). The critique in a rudimentary form dates back to 
Phelps Brown (1957) and even earlier. The argument is that the income accounting 
identity, according to which value added is definitionally equal to the sum of the wage 
bill plus total profits, can be expressed as an approximation in a form that resembles an 
aggregate production function.
1 Thus, all that estimations of aggregate production 
functions achieve is to track this identity, and no inferences should necessarily be made 
about the underlying technology of the economy. A corollary is that estimations of 
putative aggregate production functions should, because of the underlying identity, give 
estimates of the supposed output elasticities that are close, or identical, to the relevant 
                                                 
1 We define an aggregate production function as that which uses value data (however deflated) as 
opposed to physical quantities. Therefore, firm-level data in value terms (e.g., use of value added 
or gross output as measures of output) are equally affected by this problem.   3
factor shares. This is regardless of whether or not there is perfect competition. Where this 
equality does not occur, it is simply because the approximation to the underlying identity 
is not close enough. 
 
  There is, however, a misunderstanding over this argument that has appeared in 
the course of personal exchanges and workshops, and which we believe is worth 
clarifying. The confusion arises because while the neoclassical approach also considers 
the accounting identity, it does so in a slightly different way with important implications. 
The identity that normally appears in most microeconomic textbooks is the “total cost” 
identity, where costs are definitionally equal to the wage bill (as the labor market is 
assumed to be competitive) and the total cost of capital, which is defined as the 
competitively determined rental price of capital multiplied by the capital stock. The rental 
price of capital thus may differ from that implied by the rate of profit that is derived from 
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The confusion that has arisen is that 
it has been erroneously argued that as Felipe and McCombie implicitly use this “total 
cost” definition of the identity, it is hardly surprising that the estimates of the output 
elasticities are close to the factor shares. If one assumes that markets are perfectly 
competitive, this result is precisely what neoclassical production theory predicts. 
 
This paper explicitly considers these two identities. It is shown that the existence 
of the neoclassical identity based on the assumption of perfect competition, and which 
may be termed a “virtual” identity as compared with the “actual” identity derived for the 
NIPA, does not affect our argument.
2 We show that our critique of the aggregate 
production function, which questions the concept of total factor productivity growth as a 
meaningful measure of technical change, is not invalidated by the conceptual difference 
between the rental price of capital and the profit rate. This does not imply that the 
neoclassical identity is wrong, per se. One can certainly construct an identity in any way 
one wishes, so long as the equality of the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equation is 
preserved. Our contention is that the way it is done in neoclassical economics is 
problematic because it follows from a theory (namely, the marginal theory of factor 
pricing at the aggregate level) that, as we show, is not testable. 
 
                                                 
2 We are thankful to Anwar Shaikh for suggesting these two terms for the identities.   4
  The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we outline and 
compare the two identities. Section 3 considers the theory and empirical implementation 
of the rental price of capital. Section 4 summarizes the critique of Felipe and McCombie. 
Section 5 discusses an application of our arguments to the estimation of market power by 
Hall. Section 6 addresses a second related issue that may also lead to confusion. In a 
celebrated exchange with Jorgenson and Griliches (1972), Denison (1972 a&b) 
maintained that the NIPA income accounting identity, which is the starting point of our 
derivation, holds only for current, and not constant, prices. We argue that Denison had a 
slightly different definition of the identity in mind and his strictures do not affect our 
argument. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. THE TWO IDENTITIES 
 
In nominal terms, the identity relates value added to the sum of the total wage bill and 
total profits and is expressed as: 
 
J r L w W PV V
n n n n n + ≡ + ≡ ≡ Π      (1) 
 
where 
n V is output (value added) in current prices (or nominal terms), V is output in 
constant prices, P is the value-added deflator. 
n W and
n Π  are the total wage bill and total 
profits, respectively, in nominal terms, w
n  is the nominal wage rate (measured in 
monetary units, e.g., dollars per hour or per worker), 
n r  is the nominal profit rate, 
defined as  J / r
n n Π ≡  (measured as dollars of profit per dollar of capital, i.e., a pure 
number). The variable L  is the labor input (number of hours worked or number of 
workers) and J is the value of the stock of capital in constant prices.  
 
This identity is consistent with data obtained from the NIPA. The identity also holds in 
constant prices, provided consistent deflators are used. (This is discussed further in 
Section 6 below.)  It can be straightforwardly rewritten as V = F(L, J, t), that is, in a form 
that resembles a standard aggregate production function. Empirically, F(L, J, t) can take 
any of the standard forms (i.e., the Cobb-Douglas, CES, and  translog production 
functions, etc.). 
   5
This argument explains why, despite the results of the Cambridge Capital Theory 
Controversies (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003) and the literature on aggregation, recently 
surveyed by Felipe and Fisher (2003), the estimation of the aggregate production function 
V = F(L, J, t) in a specific functional form yields, at times, good and plausible results. By 
this we mean that the obtained statistical fit is usually high; the standard errors of the 
estimates are small; the estimated elasticities are relatively close to the factor shares 
calculated from data in the NIPA (although sometimes they diverge for reasons discussed 
below); and that the marginal product of labor often provides a good approximation to the 
wage rate. See Fisher (1971a ) who confirms this by simulation analysis (Shaikh, 1980). 
  
Felipe and McCombie have argued, as an implication, that the residual measure 
of total factor productivity (TFP) growth is simply a weighted average of the growth rates 
of the wage and profit rates, where the weights are the factor shares. This is a well-known 
result of neoclassical production theory and is referred to as the “dual” measure of total 
factor productivity growth. Felipe and McCombie argue, however, that the interpretation 
in the neoclassical literature of this weighted average as a measure of the rate of 
“technical change” (or the rate of increase in efficiency) is theoretically unfounded. This 
is because it necessarily depends on a supposed link between the income accounting 
identity and the aggregate production function. As the aggregate production function 
theoretically does not exist, the neoclassical result is merely a tautology that results from 
rewriting the income identity in growth rates. The weighted average of the wage and 
profit rates should be interpreted simply as a measure of distributional changes. 
 
The neoclassical approach also considers the accounting identity, but with 




n K p L w   pQ Ω + + ≡      (2) 
 
where pQ is total revenue, Q is the physical quantity of homogeneous output, p is the 
dollar price of output, K is the number of identical physical capital units,
3 
n
K p  is the 
competitive rental price of capital in nominal terms (measured in dollars per unit of 
capital), and 
n Ω  is the current price value of “economic profits”.  If perfect competition 
                                                 
3  “Leets”, to use Meade’s term.   6
is assumed, as it generally is, equation (2) becomes  K p L w pQ
n
K
n + ≡ , which is the 
“virtual” identity referred to above. This approach assumes that labor and capital markets 
are competitive and thus the factor prices 
n w and 
n
K p  equal their corresponding marginal 
revenue products, which measure their opportunity cost. This approach tries to “draw a 
conceptual distinction between the imputed return to capital and the income of 
capitalists” (Solow 1964, p.11). 
 
The neoclassical cost identity is given by  K p L w C
n
K
n n + ≡ .
4 These are the costs 
to the firm (including the normal profits) and not its revenues. Consequently, it does not 
include economic profits, if any. The neoclassical total cost identity appears in most 
microeconomics textbooks, where the variables are microeconomic constructs expressed 
as physical quantities. The central tenet of this paper is that in applied macroeconomic 
work physical quantities are not used, but rather aggregates which are deflated value 
measures. The two are not the same. Real output is not a physical quantity, but is 
measured in, say, dollar prices of a particular base year and the same is true for the capital 
stock. Also, as we shall see later, the rental price of capital used in empirical applications 
is not a “price”, but an index. Aggregate data (even at the firm level) and aggregate 
production functions involve the use of data in value terms, however they are deflated. 
Micro-production functions involve ideally the use of data in physical terms, although 
there are very few estimations of such engineering production functions.  
 
The problem is that the identity underlying applied macroeconomic work (and 
work at the 3 or 4 digit level industries, and firm-level data) is not given by equation (2), 
n n
K




n J P L w PV Ω + + ≡      (3) 
 
where in the neoclassical analysis 
n
J P  is interpreted as the competitive rental price of 
capital, but is actually a pure number, the rate of return. In many cases, however, it is 
constructed as an index, in which case it can only be used when equation (3) is expressed 
                                                 
4  It should be noted that this differs from the neoclassical cost function which takes the general 
form C = G(w, r, Q), where C, w and r are in real terms and specific functional forms include, for 
example,  the translog cost function.   7
in growth rates, as in the growth accounting approach, or in log-levels, but not in levels. 
While equation (3) is correct from a definitional point of view, the assumption made is 
that it is the natural extension of the microeconomic identity to the aggregate level. It can 
be seen that equation (1) implicitly sums the terms  J P
n
J  and 
n Ω  in the neoclassical 
identity, equation (3), to give  J   r
n . This is labeled total profits (
n Π ), i.e., 
n n
J
n n J P J r Ω Π + ≡ ≡ , as the accounting identity (1) must hold always by definition, 
since value added measured in the NIPA includes any economic profits under the 
category “operating surplus”. The concepts of the profit rate and the rental price of capital 
are analogous, but subtly and importantly different. The profit rate is the firm’s return on 
its capital, whereas the rental price of capital is the imputed cost to the firm on its capital. 
The difference between the rate of profit and the rental price of capital is that the former 
incorporates both the imputed cost of capital (in general, an unobservable variable) and 
oligoplistic, or economic, profits (rents), should these exist. The important aspect to note 
is that the assumption of perfect competition in the capital markets is needed to derive 
n
K p . 
 
This difference between the profit rate and the rental price of capital has, at times, 
caused confusion concerning the argument about the transformation of the accounting 
identity into the putative aggregate production function. This has arisen because when we 
write the NIPA identity,  rJ wL V + = , where w is the real wage rate ( P w w
n / = )  and r is 
the real rate of profit (r = r
n/P) , neoclassical economists usually define the corresponding 
microeconomic identity as  K p L   w Q
*
K + =
∗ , where p w w
n / =
∗  and  p p p
n
K K /
* = are the 
real wage rate and the rental price of capital both measured in real, or commodity, terms.  
The neoclassical approach, thus, implicitly generally assumes that there are no economic 
profits in the total cost accounting identity, i.e.,  0 =
∗ Ω , where  p / Ω Ω =
∗ . We discuss 
the case where this not the situation in Section 5. 
 
Why does the above distinction matter? The answer is that as the neoclassical 
model usually assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale, it is erroneously 
thought, as we noted above, that our approach also makes the same assumptions, namely 
that the value of the accounting identity excludes any monopoly profits. As one of the 
implications of the transformation of the income accounting identity into V = F(J, L, t) is   8
that the putative estimated output elasticities must equal the observed factor shares (thus 
indicating competitive markets), it has been consequently erroneously argued that our 
argument is simply a tautology.
5 In other words, as the neoclassical identity assumes 
perfect competition, it is argued that it is hardly surprising that the transformation we use 
shows that the output elasticities equal the factor shares. However, we argue that this 
result will always occur, whatever the actual state of competition. 
 
  Before discussing this in further detail, it is necessary to discuss first the concept 
of the rental price of capital in greater detail. 
 
3. NEOCLASSICAL THEORY AND THE RENTAL PRICE OF CAPITAL 
 
The rental price of capital, 
n
K p , is a central concept in the neoclassical theory of 
productivity that has its origins in the neoclassical theory of investment developed by 
Jorgenson (1963). The rental price of capital is the implicit price that the firm charges 
itself for the assets that it owns, and is equal to the price that it would have to pay to rent 
an equivalent asset in a competitive market. However, there are no data on rental costs, 
except for a few markets (such as for aircraft). In most cases, firms have purchased and 
own the assets themselves. If well-developed rental markets existed for all types of 
capital goods, it would be possible to observe the relevant rental rate on capital and, 
therefore, to calculate economic profits. But as such data do not generally exist, one must 
typically infer indirectly the rental price of capital. 
 
For this purpose, Jorgenson (1963) assumed the existence of a perfect market for 
secondhand goods, as well as perfect markets for all inputs and output. The former 
implies that firms would not need to worry about locking themselves in by purchasing 
long-lived investment goods, as such goods could be sold on the secondhand market at a 
price equal to the present value of their expected services over their expected remaining 
lifetimes. This way, firms are seen as renting capital goods to themselves during each 
time period and charging themselves an implicit cost, namely, the rental price of capital 
. 
                                                 
5 Ironically, this is precisely the charge we make about the neoclassical approach.   9
There are two important issues in this framework. First, it is assumed that each 
factor gets paid according to the marginal product, which reflects its opportunity cost, 
namely,  L F ∂ ∂ /  for labor, and  K F ∂ ∂ / for capital. This follows from the first-order 
conditions of profit maximization. Above we referred to the neoclassical identity as a 
“virtual” identity because it depends on the conditions that 
∗ = ∂ ∂ w L F / a n d  
* / K p K F = ∂ ∂ . Moreover, at the macro level, these conditions ( w L F = ∂ ∂ /  and 
J P J F = ∂ ∂ / ) depend on the existence of the aggregate production function V = F(J, L). 
This is by no means an innocuous assumption. Felipe and Fisher (2003) have summarized 
the aggregation literature, which indicates that the presumption must be that F (J, L) does 
not exit. 
 
Secondly, it is assumed for labor services that the wage rate correctly measures 
the marginal aggregate productivity of labor, i.e., 
n w L F p = ∂ ∂ /.  B u t  w h a t  a b o u t  
n
K p K F p = ∂ ∂ / ? There is a problem here because, as we have noted, generally, there are 
no statistics for 
n
K p , the implicit price that firms pay for capital, K. Consequently, 
n
K p  
must be calculated using a number of assumptions.  
 
Following Jorgenson (1963), the rental price of capital is obtained from an 
infinite-horizon dynamic optimization problem. In this model, the firm chooses the path 
of labor (L), gross investment (I), and net capital (K), so as to maximize the present value 
of its net cash flow. The firm’s constraints are the technology, reflected in the production 
function Q = F(K, L) and the equation of the motion of capital. The idea behind this 
formulation is that the firm will choose to hire that number of machines for which the 
marginal revenue product is equal to their market rental value. The firm’s objective is to 





− − − −
t s
n t s ds s I s q s L s w L K F s p e   )] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( [  
) ( ρ ,     (4) 
 
subject to   dK/dt  = I - δK,  
 
where  ρ is the nominal expected long-run opportunity cost of capital at time t 
(representing the opportunity cost of having funds tied up in a machine rather than in, say, 
a financial investment earning a particular rate of return), and time (s) runs from present   10
time to perpetuity. The variable p is the output price; 
n w  is the wage rate; and q is the 
acquisition price of the investment good - the price (measured in dollars) of a capital good 
that produces one machine-hour of capital per year. δ is the constant rate of depreciation.  
Setting up the Hamiltonian and applying the maximum principle yields the implied rental 
price of capital (before taxes): 
 





K & − + = =
∂
∂
δ ρ      (5) 
 
where all variables are valued at period t values, 
n
K p K F p = ∂ ∂ /  is the marginal revenue 
product of capital, 
n
K p  is again the rental price of capital services, and  ) 1 ( ) ( − − = t q t q q &  
is the revaluation (the capital gain or loss). Equation (5) indicates that the imputed rental 
price of capital is equivalent in competitive equilibrium to the marginal revenue product 
value per unit of capital services. The expected capital gain or loss is calculated, for 
example, as a three-year moving average of the annual price change of the capital good 
(Vijselaar and Albers 2002; see also OECD 2001, p.87, Box 5). 
 
For empirical purposes, there are two alternative ways to estimate ρ, the only 
unknown in equation (5). First, some authors use an observed or current measure of the 
firm’s real current cost of funds, such as the dividend yield of the Standard & Poor 500 
portfolio (Hall 1990, p. 83), or a composite of several rates (Whiteman 1988, p. 258). 
Other researchers, however, assume that economic profits are zero (i.e., Ω = 0) and then 
derive the cost of funds residually from the value-added identity (Jorgenson and Griliches 
1967; Jorgenson et al. 1987). Hulten (2000, p.12 & p.19) argues that the assumption of 
constant returns is necessary to estimate the return to capital as a residual, again bringing 
up the link with the production function.  
 
According to Hulten (2000), the latter procedure imposes constant returns for the 
measurement of TFP growth. This second method (i.e., the one that includes the 
assumption that economic profits are zero) consists in equating the value of property 
compensation to the value of capital services, that is,  K   p
n
K
n = Π , where 
n Π  is total 
property compensation (measured in, say, dollars). This, in turn, equals total payments to 
capital derived as a residual of output after all other inputs have been paid. But it should   11
be remembered that in the actual microeconomic identity, 
n Π  equals pQ minus the wage 
bill ( L w
n ), that is, total profits, which equals  K p
n
K . This implies: 
 
K ) q q q ( K p
n
K
n & − + = = δ ρ Π      (6) 
 







K ) q q (





ρ      (7) 
 
Therefore, the competitively earned rate of return computed this way is the ratio 
of property compensation to the value of assets, less depreciation and plus the growth in 
capital gains. The rental price of capital is now obtained by substituting the expression for 
ρ (equation (7)) into the formula for the rental price of capital (equation (5)).
6 This 
reduces, however, to  K p
n n
K / Π = . Therefore, it should be noted that the rental price 
calculated in this way is compatible with to what we have defined in the actual identity as 
the profit rate (i.e.,  J r K p
n n
K = ), except that economic profits are assumed to be zero in 
the neoclassical derivation.  
 
Nevertheless, the calculation of the profit rate in the identity (1) does not assume 
that economic profits are zero. It must also be emphasized that, in practice, aggregate data 
are not measured in homogeneous physical units, as they theoretically should be. In 
particular, in practice, q is not the price of a capital good, but the investment deflator 
(e.g., see Hall 1990, p.83). The same applies to all the variables used in this section. 
 
                                                 
6   An example, following Denison (1969, p.45) but with some modifications, will help 
illustrate the procedure. Assume the price of equipment is q = $50,000 (this is the price of a capital 
good that produces, say, n machine-hours of capital per year); the rate of return (% per annum), 
calculated as the ratio of interest plus profit income ($4,000) and capital gains ($1,000) to the 
value of capital equipment, ($50,000),  is ρ = [($4,000+$1,000)/$50,000] = 10%; depreciation on 
equipment  δ = ($7,000/$50,000)=14%; capital gains on equipment holdings  q / q &  = 
($1,500/$50,000) = 3%. Then 
n
K p =$50,000(0.10 + 0.14 – 0.03) = $10,500 which is interpreted as 
the price (or earnings) of n machine-hours of capital per year. This can be disaggregated into 
$5,000 representing the opportunity cost of the funds invested in the machine, $7,000 of physical 
cost of deterioration and to this we have to subtract $1,500 for the change in value.   12
As can be seen, the method to derive a value for 
n
K p  is far from straightforward. 
Griliches and Jorgenson admit that extracting this information from the firms’ accounts is 
an almost insuperable problem, and that the information must be obtained by a relatively 
lengthy chain of indirect inference (Griliches and Jorgenson 1966, p.51). Harcourt also 
indicates that the estimates of capital services have to be obtained by a chain of dubious 
assumptions (e.g., that competitive producer equilibrium conditions were in fact satisfied 
and that all machines worked in the same proportion as their capacities (Harcourt 1972, 
p.85). Mohr (1986, p.100), in a very detailed account of measurement issues of the rental 
price of capital, indicates that there is a kind of “no-man’s land” between the model’s 
theoretical structure and its application, with the result that, in practice, the concept is 
both misunderstood and mismeasured. Regarding the measurement of the opportunity 
cost  ρ, he indicates that there is an almost complete lack of consensus and that the 
literature presents a bewildering array of alternatives (Mohr 1986, p.107). 
 
As indicated above, Hulten claims that the assumption of constant returns is 
necessary to estimate the rate of return residually. In our view this is not true as the 
income accounting identity is independent of any production function, the state of 
competition, and the degree of returns to scale. The problem with the neoclassical 
interpretation of the accounting identity lies in the “virtual” connection between the 
identity and the non-existent aggregate production function, and in the fact that in 
neoclassical economics it is customary to separate the cost of capital ( K p
n
K ) from 
economic profits (
n Ω ), on the basis that the wage rate (
n w ) and the rental price of capital 
(
n
K p ) measure the corresponding marginal productivities. This way, as indicated above, 
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n n
K
n K p L w Ω + + =    (8) 
  
And assuming long-run competitive markets, i.e., 
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  K p L w
n
K
n + =        (9) 
 
Equation (9) is presented in many textbooks as if it were an actual identity, 
although it is written in (constant price) value terms (i.e., aggregate level) as 
rJ wL V + = . In neoclassical theory, the production function and the accounting identity 
are linked via Euler’s theorem (Hulten 2000, p.11).  
 
In fact, it is often claimed that the identity is a consequence of the theorem, which 





























, it follows that  K p L w ) K , L ( F pQ
n
K
n + = = . Thus, 
the argument is that the income identity holds only under constant returns and competitive 
markets. Hulten indicates that there is a “[…] close link between the GDP accounting 
identity and the production function. If the production function happens to exhibit 
constant returns to scale and the inputs are paid the value of their marginal products, the 
value of output equals the sum of the input values. This “product exhaustion” follows 
from Euler’s Theorem, and it implies that the value shares 
L s [labor’s share] and 
K s [capital’s share], sum to one” (Hulten 2000, p.11; italics added). Furthermore, in this 
sense, the argument continues, the neoclassical theory of production provides a theory of 
the national accounts (Prescott 1998, p.532). 
 
We argue that this line of reasoning is erroneous. For the above results to be 
correct, the aggregate production function must exist, must be linearly homogeneous, and 
the marginal productivity conditions must hold. These are too many ‘musts’. If the 
aggregate production function  ) , ( J L F V =  does not exist because of the aggregation 
problems, the alleged link  J P wL J L F J + = ) , ( , where  J P  is the real competitive rate of 
return (i.e., Pj  = r when there is perfect competition), has no meaning. The actual 
accounting identity, equation (1), will nevertheless always hold as it does not depend 
upon an aggregate production function and Euler’s theorem. The identity is consistent 
with any (aggregate) production function  ) , ( J L F V = , should it exist (which we doubt), 
and with the lack of a well-behaved aggregate production function. It simply shows how   14
total value added is divided between wages and profits. Furthermore, (aggregate) wage 
and profit rates may have nothing to do with the “aggregate” marginal productivities 
(what do they mean?). In an exchange with Joan Robinson, Fisher argued that: “If 
aggregate capital does not exist, then of course one cannot believe in the marginal 
productivity of aggregate capital” (Fisher 1971b, p.405; emphasis in the original). The 
same applies to the concept of the marginal productivity of labor at the aggregate level. 
 
Neoclassical economists argue, however, that if one writes  rJ wL V + ≡ , the 
implication is that economic profits (Ω) are assumed to be zero, consistent with their 
arguments about the existence of competitive markets. However, the way the actual 
income accounting identity is written, all profits are included in rJ, where r is the ex-post 
profit rate. This implies  Ω + = J P rJ J . This does not represent a problem since economic 
profits (Ω) can be written as  J P
~
J = Ω , that is, as the product of that component of the 
rate of return due to economic profits, denoted by  J P
~
, times the value of the stock of 
capital, which implies  J J P P r
~
  + = . Consequently, the following identity holds: 
J P J P wL rJ wL V J J
~
+ + ≡ + ≡ . This is seen as equivalent to  K p ~ K p wL pQ K K + + ≡ , 
where  K p ~ is the implicit firm-level price of capital resulting from economic profits. In the 
words of Samuelson: “No one can stop us from labeling this last vector [residually 
computed profit returns to “property” or to the nonlabor factor] as rJ as J.B. Clark’s 
model would permit –even though we have no warrant for believing that noncompetitive 
industries have a common profit rate r and use leets capital J in proportion to the 
L w PV
n −  elements!” (Samuelson 1979, p.932. The notation has been changed to make it 
consistent with the chapter). 
 
 
4. THE INCOME ACCOUNTING IDENTITY AND THE PRODUCTION 
FUNCTION 
 
At this stage it is useful to summarize Felipe and McCombie’s critique and its main 
implications and see how the above discussion does not undermine it in any way. We 
start by writing the value-added accounting identity, equation (1), in real terms as is 
standard in the literature (Samuelson 1979, Barro 1999, Fernald and Neiman 2003) as   15
t t t t t J r L w V + ≡ , where  ) P / w ( w
n =  and  ) P / r ( r
n = . The latter can be expressed in 
growth rates as: 
 
t t t t t t t t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a V ˆ − + + − + ≡   
      t t t t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a − + + ≡ϕ      (10) 
 
where ^ denotes a growth rate,  t t t t V / L w a ≡  is the share of labor in output or revenue, 
t t t t V / K r ) a 1 ( ≡ −  is the share of capital, and  t t t t t r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − + ≡ ϕ . Equation (10) can 
be rearranged to give: 
 
    t t t   t t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a V ˆ − − − ≡ ϕ       
     t t t t r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − + ≡        ( 1 1 )  
 
Equation (11) yields the residual measure of total factor productivity growth, 
assuming perfect competition. The first part of the equation is equivalent to the growth 
accounting equation derived from a neoclassical aggregate production function. In the 
neoclassical approach  t ct t   ct t t J ˆ   ) a 1 ( L ˆ a V ˆ − − − = ϕ  is referred to as the primal measure 
of total factor productivity growth, where ac is labour’s share in total costs which in the 
case of perfectively competitive markets equals the revenue shares, ac = a. (Strictly 
speaking V ˆ  should be the growth of total costs, i.e. excluding any economic profits. This 
is discussed further below.)  The second part of equation (11), namely  t t t t r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − + , 
equals the dual measure of total factor productivity growth, derived in neoclassical 
economics from the cost function, and calculated as  t   J ct t ct t P ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − + = ϕ . This will 
differ from  t t t t r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − +  to the extent that r ˆ  includes the growth of economic profits 
and a and ac are not equal.  
 
As indicated above, while neoclassical economists are aware of the income 
accounting identity and these results, it is important to point out the different 
interpretation. Barro (1999, pp.123-125), for example, indicates that: “the dual approach 
can be derived readily from the equality between output and factor income” (Barro 1999, 
p.123). Then he writes the income accounting identity, differentiates it, and writes it in   16
growth rates (Barro 1999, equation (7) and equation (8)). We interpret his statement about 
the equality to mean that the equation is indeed an identity. Moreover, Barro reasons: “It 
is important to recognize that the derivation of equation (8) [the growth accounting 
equation in his paper] uses only the condition V = PjJ + wL [using our notation]. No 
assumptions were made about the relations of factor prices to social marginal products or 
about the form of the production function” (Barro 1999, p.123). It is difficult to follow 
this, as the rate of return in the identity is defined earlier by Barro to be the (competitive) 
rental price of capital. 
 
Barro continues “If V = PjJ+ wL [using our notation] holds, then the primal and 
dual estimates of TFP growth inevitably coincide” (Barro 1999, p.123). He comments 
further that “…the discrepancies between the primal and dual estimates of TFP growth 
rates reflect departures from the condition V = PjJ + wL” (Barro 1999, p.124).  If left and 
right hand sides of the expression are equal because it is an identity by construction (e.g., 
data from the national accounts), and no assumptions are needed to write it, how can it 
not hold? The reason is that Barro seems to consider that Euler’s theorem and the 
existence of an aggregate production function (although not its specific functional form) 
are involved in the derivation.  Thus, if the dual is calculated from independent estimates 
of the weighted growth rates of wages and the rental price of capital, and differs from the 
primal, it could be because the estimates of the growth of the capital stock and of the 
rental price of capital implicit in the primal are subject to measurement error. In other 
words, the dual, calculated directly using the weighted growth of factor costs, differs 
from the primal. But, calculating the growth accounting equation from the identity as 
either the primal or the dual does, pace Barro, requires that factors are paid their marginal 
social products and a well-behaved aggregate production exists.
4 
 
  Shapiro (1987) tried to test whether or not the primal and dual measurements of 
productivity are equal by calculating them independently and regressing one on the other 
one. But given the arguments above regarding the problems with the theoretical 
underpinnings of the method, all Shapiro’s test amounts to is whether or not  J P r = . The 
result of the “test” depends on the procedure adopted to calculate the rental price of 
capital ( J P ), and whether this is correct, although there is no easy way to check this.  
   17
To complete our argument and see the problem of the neoclassical framework, 
suppose that one accepts the usefulness of the aggregate production function as an 
empirical device and disregards the aggregation problems (Solow 1957). To keep things 
simple, and without affecting the argument, let us assume that the estimated form is a 
Cobb-Douglas such as  t t 4 t 3 2 1 t u   J ln b     L ln b     t b   b V ln + + + + = , where u is the error term. 
Here t is a time trend and b2 measures the constant rate of TFP growth.
7 To see what 
occurs, let us return to equation (10) and assume that in the economy in question factor 
shares are constant, i.e.,  a at = . It is not assumed that factors are paid their marginal 
social products, that there is perfect competition, or indeed an aggregate production 
function actually exists. This yields:  
 
t t t t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a V ˆ − + + − + =      (12) 
 
Let us make a second assumption that real wage and profit rates grow at constant 
rates, i.e.,  w ˆ w ˆ t =  and  r ˆ r ˆt = .
8 Substitution into equation (12) yields: 
 
t t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a V ˆ − + + − + =       
 
t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a − + + =ϕ         ( 1 3 )  
 







0 t J   L e A V
ϕ =      ( 1 4 )  
                                                 
4 Hsieh (1999, 2002) and Fernald and Neiman (2003), argue, like Barro, that TFP growth can be 
derived directly form the accounting identity. Hsieh (1999, p.134), for example, erroneously 
argues that “the advantage of using the national income accounting identity instead of a cost 
function to derive the dual growth accounting methodology is that it makes explicitly clear that the 
equality of dual and primal measures of TFPG [total factor productivity growth] do not depend an 
any assumptions about the underlying technology.” This is a misunderstanding of the issue. 
 
7   Quite often, such econometric estimations using time-series data lead to very poor results. 
On this, see Sylos Labini (1995), Hulten (2000, pp.22-23), McCombie (1998b) and Felipe and 
Adams (2005). Hulten (2000, p.22) argues that the poor results “are familiar to the practitioners of 
the productivity art.” On this see also Nadiri (1970, pp.1153-1155) who briefly mentions the 
standard econometric problems encountered by practitioners estimating production functions, 
among which the most important is simultaneous equation bias. This should not be a problem, as 
the solution is, theoretically, the simultaneous estimation of the production function and the first-
order conditions (Kim and Lau 1994). 
8 Alternatively, we could assume that the rate of profit is roughly constant, so that  0 r ˆt = .   18
 
How is equation (14) to be interpreted? Given the way it has been derived, it 
must  be the income accounting identity, namely  t t t t t J r L w V + ≡ , rewritten under the 
assumptions that factor shares are constant and that wage and profit rates grow at constant 
rates. From an econometric point of view, this implies that if in the economy in question 
the two assumptions about the factor shares and the wage and profit rates happen to be 
correct, and one estimated  t t 4 t 3 2 1 t u     J ln b   L ln b     t   b   b V ln + + + + = , one would obtain a 
suspiciously perfect fit, estimates of the coefficients equal to the factor shares, i.e., 
a b3 =  and  ) a 1 ( b4 − =  (indicating putative “constant returns to scale”), and the estimate 
of b2 equal to  r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a ˆ − + = ϕ . These results, however, follow solely from the income 
identity. 
 
What if when the Cobb-Douglas relationship is estimated the results are poor (as 
sometimes happens)? That will simply imply that one, or both assumptions, used to 
derive it are incorrect. It does not invalidate the argument. For example, if  t w ˆ and  t r ˆ  are 
not constant, the assumption w ˆ w ˆ t =  and  r ˆ r ˆt =  will be incorrect and the standard Cobb-
Douglas form with a linear time trend will give a poor fit. What we need to find is the 
correct empirical paths of  t w ˆ and  t r ˆ . Upon substitution of these into equation (13) and 
proceeding as before we will obtain the corresponding “aggregate production function”. 
To see this, simply integrate equation (12) (that is, we do not make any assumption about 










t 0 t J   L   r   w   B V




t J   L   ) t ( B







t 0 r w B ) t ( B
− = . What one has to do is to find out the path of  ) t ( B . Empirical 
work suggests that a trigonometric function works well (Felipe 2001a; Felipe and Adams 
2005; Felipe and McCombie 2003). Naturally, nothing in neoclassical economics implies 
that  ) t ( B ln has to be a linear function of time. McCombie and Dixon (1991), Felipe   19
(2000), McCombie (2000) and Felipe and McCombie (2001a, 2003) show how to derive 
the CES and translog as transformations of the identity. 
 
Similar arguments apply if the production function is estimated in growth rates. 
Barro (1999, p.122) proposes this as an alternative approach to growth accounting. He 
differentiates the aggregate production function V = F(A, L, J) (his equation (1) using our 
notation), obtaining  t t t t t t J ˆ L ˆ V ˆ β α ϕ + + =  (his equation (2) using our notation). Here  t α  
and  t β  denote the factor output elasticities. Note that all variables have the subscript ‘t’ 
because they need not be constant. Then Barro argues that ϕ t measures the growth due to 
technological change. That is, in order to estimate this regression, he assumes that  t ϕ , 
t α , and  t β  are constant, which may, or may not, be empirically true. What is important 
about his argument is that in discussing the pros and cons of the regression approach, he 
acknowledges that “the regression framework has to be extended from its usual form to 
allow for time variations in factor shares and the TFP growth rate (Barro 1999, pp.122-
123). Unfortunately, this overlooks the basic problem that this takes one back to the 
identity given by equation (10). Therefore, any estimation method that allows for time-
varying parameters must yield  t t a ≡ α ,  ) a 1 ( t t − ≡ β , and  t t t t t r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − + ≡ ϕ . 
 
It should also be noted that the second line of equation (11) is a weighted average 
of the growth rates of the wage and profit rates. This, as indicated above, is referred to in 
neoclassical theory as the dual measure of total factor productivity growth and it is 
derived from the cost function (Shapiro 1987). It is argued that increases in factor prices 
can be sustained only if output increases with given inputs. “Therefore, the appropriately 
weighted average growth of the factor prices measures the extent of TFP growth” (Barro 
1999, p.123; italics added). In the long run, increases in real factor prices have to be 
related to increases in the productivity of the corresponding factors. There are, however, 
three questions with regard to this. 
 
First, the measure of total factor productivity is derived in neoclassical economics 
from a construct, the aggregate production function, which is without any sound 
theoretical foundation. The irony is that this is well established in the neoclassical 
literature. As long ago as 1970, (although the aggregation literature dates from 
considerably before this date) Nadiri, in his survey in the Journal of Economic Literature,   20
explicitly stated that the aggregation problem matters because “without proper 
aggregation we cannot interpret the properties of an aggregate production function, which 
rules the behavior of total factor productivity” (Nadiri 1970, p.1144). 
 
Secondly, we have shown that an equation that resembles a putative aggregate 
production function can be derived tautologically as a transformation of an accounting 
identity, and as such it can be interpreted only as a measure of distributional changes (not 
in a zero-sum sense). To see this, note that the growth rate of real value added equals 
t t t t t ˆ ) a 1 ( W ˆ a V ˆ Π − + ≡ , that is, the growth (measured in terms of value added) registered 
by any economy between two periods is, by definition, the sum of the growth of the total 
wage bill plus the growth of total profits each weighted by its share in value added. These 
are the sources of growth in any economy in a purely taxonomical sense and measure the 
overall distributional changes between the two classes that took place between two 
periods. As a matter of arithmetic, there is nothing wrong with rewriting the wage bill as 
the product W = wL, and total profits as the product Π = rJ, and to argue further, again as 
a matter of arithmetic, that overall growth can be decomposed into changes in L, J, w, and 
r, that is,  ) J ˆ r ˆ )( a 1 ( ) L ˆ w ˆ ( a V ˆ
t t t t t t t + − + + ≡ . In this formulation  ) L ˆ w ˆ ( a t t t + and 
) J ˆ r ˆ )( a 1 ( t t t + −  are simply the growth of labour’s and capital’s remuneration as 
components of total income growth. They can be further disaggregated into the 
components given by the growth of remuneration per worker  t tw ˆ a and the rate of return 
t t r ˆ ) a 1 ( −  and those given by the growth of the number of workers  t tL ˆ a  and the capital 
input  t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( − .  But this does not imply that  t tL ˆ a and t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( −  measure in any sense 
the independent contributions of labour and capital in a causal sense. Not only may the 
underlying production processes be so complex that they cannot be represented by a 
single-commodity model in any meaningful way, but trying to attribute the contribution 
to output growth of that of a single factor of production separately may be conceptually 
problematical. Improvements in production processes come through learning by doing 
and arise to a large extent when there is capital accumulation. But the development and 
use of new types of machinery open up the scope for more inventions, which otherwise 
would not have occurred. Moreover, these improvements ultimately are due to labour, or 
human ingenuity. Growth in this sense is both path dependent and caused by the 
complementary growth of the factors of production.   21
   
As Nelson (1981, p.1054) pointed out, the production process is a complementary 
effort between the various inputs. It is rather like baking a cake, and in what way is it 
meaningful to discuss the quantitative contribution of the ingredients such as flour or milk 
each to the cake? The problem with the neoclassical production function is that it has 
channelled the analysis of growth along a very narrow and, in our opinion, not very 
illuminating path. Nor does endogenous growth theory take us much further forward, 
being similarly based on the aggregate production function.   
 
What are we to make, therefore, of Barro’s argument that an economy that 
experiences an increase in both its real wage and profit rates must have increased its 
overall level of productivity? It could be argued that  t t t t t r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − + = ϕ  measures such 
a rate of growth of efficiency. Certainly, under these circumstances one can say that the 
economy is better off, since obviously this is contributing positively to output growth. 
The point to note, however, is that it is not possible to ascribe this unambiguously to the 
result of technical change in the way it is done in the neoclassical model (i.e., by claiming 
that there is a theoretical justification). There is no reason to assume that the factor shares, 
i.e., the appropriate or theoretically justified weights according to Barro, equal the output 
elasticities of the true aggregate production function (if it, in fact, exists), or that 
production is necessarily subject to constant returns to scale (although this is what the use 
of value data will show).  
 
Our derivation is simply a tautology resulting from an identity with no behavioral 
assumptions or implications. Wages are likely to be correlated with labor productivity, 
and changes in the rate of profit are also likely to be associated with changes in the 
output-capital ratio. (If factor shares are constant, then the growth of the wages rate will 
be, by definition, equal to the growth of productivity and the growth in the rate of profit 
will be equal to the growth of the output-capital ratio.) But the only possible way to argue 
that  t ϕ  in equation (10) is a measure of the rate of technical change is to postulate the 
existence of an aggregate production function, together with constant returns to scale and 
the conditions for producer equilibrium. This is required as a justification for using the 
factor shares to weight the growth rates of the wage and profit rates in order to derive a 
combined index of total factor productivity growth, and for considering  t tL ˆ a  and   22
t t J ˆ ) a 1 ( −  as a measure of the contribution, in a causal sense, of the growth of the factor 
inputs to output growth. 
 
Apart from all the theoretical issues raised, our contention in the previous section 
is that there is no way to know if the rental price has been calculated correctly and 
whether or not the figures used in empirical applications do really correspond to the 
theoretical counterpart. There is no way of determining, for example, whether any 





5. THE RENTAL PRICE OF CAPITAL AND MARKET POWER: HALL 
(1988) REVISITED 
 
In this section we consider how the problem of economic profits is dealt with in the 
influential neoclassical study of Hall (1988) and the intrinsic shortcomings that it suffers 
from because of the underlying NIPA identity. Hall (1988) argued that Solow’s procedure 
for estimating the growth of TFP (the residual) was flawed because it assumed perfect 
competition. Hall putatively showed how it was possible to specify a model using 
aggregate data for output and factor inputs where the size of the mark-up due to market 
                                                 
9   In this sense, we do not disagree with Fisher and McGowan (1983) when they claim that: 
“Accounting rates of return are frequently used as indices of monopoly power and market 
performance by economists and lawyers. Such procedure is valid only to the extent that profits are 
indeed monopoly profits, accounting profits are in fact economic profits, and the accounting rate 
of return equals the economic rate of return” (Fisher and McGowan 1983, p.82). This is exactly 
what we show above. Fisher and McGowan are correct that using r in lieu of  J P (or  J P
~
) is wrong 
to the extent that  J J P
~




10   Hall (1990, p.84) quite correctly indicates that the difference between the revenue and 
cost-based residuals depends on the level of pure profit (Ω). Fernald and Neiman (2003, p.2) 
derive TFP growth directly form the accounting identity and argue that the primal-dual difference 
reflects economically interesting imperfections in output, labor, and capital markets including 
heterogeneity in the user cost of capital and sizeable economic profits. Shapiro (1987, footnote 4), 
Hall (1990) and Fernald and Neiman (2003) clearly understand the issue, but maintain the 
neoclassical approach. Shapiro (1987) notes that if the rental price of capital were derived from the 
national accounts, the regression of the primal on the dual would be tautological. The argument of 
this chapter is, however, that the identity (1) is not linked to the aggregate production function and 
thus it does not have any associated assumptions built in. This is, in the authors’ opinion, what 
makes the test of Shapiro and Hall problematic. Furthermore, as indicated above, their whole 
argument rests on whether the measurement of the rental price of capital, which is theory 
dependent, is correct.   23
power could be estimated. Felipe and McCombie (2002a) have argued that the underlying 
identity, in effect, invalidates this procedure and presented econometric analysis to 
support this contention. In this section, we develop the theoretical basis of our argument, 
as it again clearly shows that the identity does not depend upon the assumption of 
perfectly competitive markets. 
 
As we have noted, the orthodox neoclassical production function is given by 
) t , L , K ( F Q = , where Q is the volume of output, say, the number of widgets, L  is 
employment or total hours worked, and K is again the number of machines (or machine 
hours). Consequently, no value relationship appears in this production function. 
 
The marginal product of labor, given by  L / Q ∂ ∂ , is again measured in widgets, 
but may be expressed in monetary units,  ) L / Q ( p ∂ ∂ , where p is the price of widgets (in, 
say, dollars per widget, and it is not a deflator). The expression for output in value terms 
again comes from the actual accounting identity  K r L w pQ
n n + ≡ , where 
n w  and 
n r  are 
nominal monetary values (dollars per worker and dollars per machine, respectively). 













α        ( 1 6 )  
 










= − = − =
∂
∂
α      (17) 
 
where (1-a) is capital’s share. 
 
Under conditions of perfect competition, we also know from neoclassical theory 
that  x p = , where x is the marginal cost. Consequently, the monetary value of the 
marginal physical product of labor is 
n w ) L / Q (   x ) L / Q (   p = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ . Furthermore, we 
also know that if factors are paid their marginal products, the total product is exhausted 
(Euler’s Theorem):   24
K F L F K p L w C Q K L
*
K
* + ≡ + ≡ ≡
∗      (18) 
 
where  p / w w L / Q F
n *




K = = ∂ ∂ = ; and C
* denotes total 
cost in commodity terms. 
 
In nominal terms, equation (18) becomes: 
 
K xF L xF K p L w C xQ K L
n
K
n n + ≡ + ≡ ≡    (19) 
 
 
Suppose, following Hall (1988, p.923), that only the labor market is competitive 
(i.e., Ω ≠ 0).
11 We now have: 
 
Ω + + ≡ K p L w pQ
n
K
n     
 





n + + ≡   
 











k p ~  is the component of the nominal rate of profit due to economic profits and 
x p > . Total cost to the firm is again given by  K ) x / p ( L ) x / w ( C
n
K
n * + = . The output 





















K . This is because the non-
competitive (monopoly or oligopoly) element of the rate of return 
n
K p ~  is not related to the 
technical conditions of production, but is merely the result of prices and redistribution. 
Note that  ) x / w ( ) p / w (




K < . So we have two identities given 
by equations (18) and (19) and given the previous inequalities it follows that: 
                                                 
11   Hall (1988, p.923): “It [the firm] faces a labor market in which the firm can engage any 
amount of labor at the same wage, w. Sometime in advance of the realization of demand, the firm 
chooses a capital stock. I do not assume anything about the market for capital goods, nor, for that 
matter, do I assume that the firm’s investment policy is optimal. However, I do assume that the 
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n n
> = α      ( 2 1 )  
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K ) p ~ p (









< = −α    (22)
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It will be seen that the output elasticities sum to unity, that the output elasticity of 
labor is greater than its revenue share and, conversely, that the output elasticity of capital 
is less than its revenue share. Intuitively, this is because part of capital’s revenue share is 
due to monopoly profits and these have nothing to do with capital’s contribution to 
output. 
 
Let us now consider Hall’s analysis. We shall assume no technical change, and 
that the marginal products are constant. The marginal cost (or, alternatively, the 
opportunity cost) of a widget is:  
 













+ =      ( 2 3 )  
 
 
Note that  K p ~  does not enter into this expression as it is not an economic or 




























=   (24) 
 
or 
                                                 
12 From equation (18) we have Q)]   x /( ) K p [( Q)]   L)/(x w [( 1
n
K
n + ≡ ; from equation 





n + + ≡  ; and from equation (21), 
L)/(pQ)] (w [ L)/(xQ)] w [(
n n > . Consequently, equation (22) follows.   26
K ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a Q ˆ
c c − + =      ( 2 5 )  
 
where  Q ˆ  denotes the growth rate of output, etc., and  c a  is the share of labor in total 
costs, namely,  K p L w C
n
K
n n + = , and not in total revenue, namely, 





n + + ≡ .  
 
We may express equation (24) as: 
 
) K ˆ L ˆ ( a ) K ˆ L ˆ (
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= , where a is, as before, labor’s share in total 
revenue, this may be written as: 
 
) K ˆ L ˆ (   a   ) x / p ( K ˆ Q ˆ − = −      (27) 
 
Denoting  (p/x) by µ, equation (27) becomes  ) K ˆ L ˆ ( a K ˆ Q ˆ − = − µ , where the 
estimate of µ gives the value of the mark-up, i.e., (p/x). Thus, to test putatively the joint 
hypotheses of perfect competition (the marginal productivity theory of distribution) and 
constant returns to scale, Hall ideally should estimate:  
 
)] K ˆ L ˆ ( a [   c K ˆ Q ˆ − + = − µ        (28) 
 
where c is the constant term, but as he used value data for US manufacturing he actually 
estimated: 
 
)] J ˆ L ˆ ( a [   c J ˆ V ˆ − + = − µ      (29) 
 
and tested whether µ was significantly different from unity for 26 industries, using an 
instrumental variable approach (Hall, 1988, Table 5, p.941). He found that in most cases   27
this was the case (with the estimate sometimes taking implausibly high values, although 
in two cases taking a negative value). Hall argued that this demonstrated that 
manufacturing is subject to considerable market power. 
 
However, in view of our arguments, we are in a position to offer an alternative, 
more parsimonious, interpretation. The problem is that the empirical analysis does not use 
physical measures of output but rather constant-price value added, i.e. 
t i 0 i t Q p V ∑ =  
where  0 i p  denotes the base year prices of the various quantities of each product i and Vt 
is value added at time t in constant prices. Thus, when the expression PV = V
n (often 
misleadingly interpreted as pQ, i.e., current price multiplied by a physical quantity) is 
written as the current price value of total output (i.e., value added), the obvious point is 
often forgotten that P is a price deflator (an index), not a price, and V is constructed using 
value data, namely the observed prices. 
  
One of the implications of this issue is that, unlike a physical measure, value 
added is affected by the distribution of income. Assume that there is a fixed bundle of 
physical outputs. If the distribution of income changes (and consequently demand for 
these products) so will the “constant price” value of our measure of output. The other 
point to note is that the relative prices used will be observed market prices and will be 
affected by any market power. Thus we have in current prices:  
 









n W J r L w Q p PV V Π    (30) 
 
Equation (30) may be expressed as  J r L w V
n n n + ≡  where 
n w  and 
n r  are the 
average observed wage rate and rate of profit. By definition, from the accounting identity, 
the observed rate of return can be calculated as  J / ) L w V ( r
n n n − ≡  (assuming the other 
four series are available). In growth rates we have (assuming, for the moment, that there 
is no growth in the weighted average of the growth rate of the wage and profit rates) 
 
J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a V ˆ − + ≡ ,     (31) 
or,      
) J ˆ L ˆ ( a ) J ˆ V ˆ ( − ≡ −      ( 3 2 )    28
 
Thus, if we were to regress  ) J ˆ V ˆ ( −  on  ) J ˆ L ˆ ( a −  we must find µ = 1, regardless 
of the state of competition.  
 
Introducing putative technical change does not alter the story, except that it is 
now possible to find µ ≠ 1 because of misspecification of the rate of growth of wages and 
the rate of profit. It is for this reason that Hall finds that µ exceeds unity. To see this, we 
must look at the case where an allowance is made for technical change 
 
According to neoclassical production theory, the measure of marginal cost with 
“technical change” and capital growth is:  
 
   
Q Q









=      ( 3 3 )  
 
where -λQ is the amount by which output would have risen given no increase in L or K, 
assuming Hicks neutral technical change of a rate given λ. Equation (33) may be written 
as a relationship between the growth of output and inputs as  K ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a Q ˆ
c c t − + + = λ , (λ 
has an explicit time subscript to emphasise that it changes over time) and the mark-up  
may be estimated by using the equation: 
 
)] K ˆ L ˆ ( a [ K ˆ Q ˆ
t − + = − µ λ      (34) 
 
 
using an instrumental variable approach, but where, again, value data has to be used, 
namely, V ˆ  instead of Q ˆ  and  J ˆ  instead of K ˆ . But if we use value data the following is 
definitionally true from the underlying identity (now the weighted growth of w and r is 
not constant): 
 
    J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a V ˆ − + + − + ≡    (35) 
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Consequently,  )] J ˆ L ˆ ( a [ r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a ) J ˆ V ˆ ( − + − + ≡ − µ , where µ = 1 by 
definitional. Hall finds that µ > 1 because he estimates: 
 
)] J ˆ L ˆ ( a [ c ) J ˆ V ˆ ( − + = − µ      (36) 
 
In other words, he assumes that the Solow residual or the rate of technical progress is a 
constant with a random error term. 
 
However, as the expression  r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a − +  empirically fluctuates procyclically 
around a constant, proxying it by a constant causes an omitted variable bias, which affects 
the estimate of µ, biasing it upwards and hence giving the misleading result of the 
existence of market power. The instrumental variable approach does not overcome this 
problem, and moreover, as we are dealing with an identity the questions of exogeneity, 
endogeneity and simultaneity do not arise. This is not to say market power does not exist, 
it is just that this method cannot not test this hypothesis. 
 
Hall (1988) also approaches the problem from another angle. Suppose, he argues, 
that there is no market power, then the Solow residual is given by: 
 
λ = − − − ) K ˆ L ˆ ( a ) K ˆ Q ˆ (  + et      (37) 
 
where it is assumed that  λ is constant and et is a random error term. 
With market power, the Solow residual is given by 
 
) K ˆ L ˆ )( 1 ( ) K ˆ L ˆ ( a ) K ˆ Q ˆ ( − − − = − − − µ λ + ut     (38) 
 
where ut is the error term. 
 
Assume that there is an instrumental variable that is correlated with output and 
input growth, but not with shifts in productivity, i.e. not with the right hand side of 
equation (37) where there is no market power. If there is market power, Hall suggests that 
the instrument will now be correlated with the residual, because of the presence of   30
) K ˆ L ˆ )( 1 ( − − µ on the right hand side of equation (38). Hall suggested military spending, 
the world oil price and the political party of the President as possible instruments. 
Generally, he finds that the instruments are correlated with the Solow residual and that 
“the evidence favors a certain amount of market power as against the hypothesis of pure 
competition” (Hall, 1988, p.938).  
 
However, using value data, the identity is given by: 
 
r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a ) J ˆ L ˆ ( a ) J ˆ V ˆ ( − + ≡ − − −       ( 3 9 )  
 
Moreover, we know that empirically the weighted growth of the real wage rate 
and the rate of profit varies procyclically. Thus, any instrumental variable that is 
correlated with the left hand side of equation (39) must necessarily be correlated with the 
right hand side, and no inference of the existence market power, or otherwise should be 
drawn from this result. 
 
To conclude this section, it will be recalled that the definition of value added is 
J P
~
J P wL V J J + + ≡ . Suppose we were to accept all the neoclassical assumptions and 
that there is market power and wish to calculate the growth of TFP (tfp). Given all the 
usual neoclassical assumptions, we would use cost shares and the growth of TFP would 
be given by:   
 
J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a V ˆ tfp c c − − − ≡      (40) 
 
But the growth of value added from the national accounts equals: 
 
J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a P ˆ ~
) a a 1 ( P ˆ a w ˆ a V ˆ
J J P J J P − + + − − + + ≡     (41) 
 
 
where  a, 
J P a   and (
J P a a 1 − − ) are the shares of wages (wL), capital ( J PJ ) and 
monopoly profits ( J P
~
J ) in total revenue (V). It follows that tfp is given by substituting 
equation (41) into equation (40):   31
 
J ˆ ) a a ( L ˆ ) a a ( P ˆ ~
) a a 1 ( P ˆ a w ˆ a tfp c c J J P J J P − + − + − − + + =    (42) 
 
It can be seen that the residual is also capturing the effects of the monopoly 
profits. Ideally, if there is market power, and under the neoclassical assumptions, we wish 
to calculate the “true” Solow residual or the growth of TFP, then for consistency we 
should deduct monopoly profits from the recorded value added in the national accounts. It 
follows that  J P wL J P
~
V ' V J J + ≡ − ≡  and: 
 
J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a P ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a ' V ˆ
c c J c c − + + − + =    (43) 
 
The “true” growth of total factor productivity is given by: 
 
J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a ' V ˆ P ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a ' tfp c c J c c − − − ≡ − + ≡  (44) 
 
and not by  J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a V ˆ
c c − − −  which is the implicit measure in Hall (1988). 
 
We are now back to an accounting identity (although different from the 
“revenue” identity) – in fact, it is the neoclassical “virtual” identity discussed earlier- and 
all the arguments about the problems this poses for estimating production functions 
follow through exactly. Intuitively, the neoclassical approach implicitly assumes that V is 
a physical measure (i.e., numbers of widgets or Q) and so its value is invariant to the state 
of competition. Once again, we come back to the problem that the measure of output is 




6. DENISON’S DENIAL OF THE CONSTANT PRICE ACCOUNTING 
IDENTITY 
   32
In this final section we address another issue regarding the accounting identity, and which 
may lead some readers to believe that our approach is problematic.
13 It must be recalled 
that the identity equation (3) is widely used in macroeconomic work (e.g., Barro 1999), 
and that Samuelson (1979) and Simon (1979b), inter alios, used it also in the same 
context we have. However, in his celebrated exchange with Jorgenson and Griliches 
(1972), Denison (1972a&b) makes the claim that the accounting identity equation (1), 
J r L w W PV V
n n n n n + ≡ + ≡ ≡ Π , does not hold in constant prices, i.e., 
t t t t t J r L w V + ≡ , where  ) P / w ( w
n = a n d   ) P / r ( r
n = . If this is correct, how can the 
identity be mistaken for an aggregate production function, where magnitudes in constant 
prices are used?  
 
Denison argues as follows: 
 
“But current price measures have little to do with “productivity measurement” 
and the identity does not hold in constant prices at factor cost – unless one 
abolishes the concept of productivity change. Productivity change is precisely a 
measure of the degree to which the identity does not hold. There is no such 
accounting relationship between input and output at constant prices by any 




We stress that the fact that the NIPA are collected only in nominal terms does not 
invalidate our argument. This is because nothing prevents us from writing nominal value 
added as the product of the GDP deflator times “real” value added, that is, as  PV V
n ￿ß , 
as shown above, and then construct the right-hand side of equation (1) 
appropriately. Of course in this case the “real” factor prices w and r  will be in 
terms of the output deflator. Thus, what equation (14) implies is that the estimate 







t   φ
t J   L e A V  will be a weighted 
average of the “real” wage in profit rates where the latter are in terms of the 
output deflator. That traditionally one refers to the real wage rate in terms of the 
consumer price index deflator does not mean that it is the only deflator for the 
nominal wage rate, and that our arguments are incorrect. Moreover, we could have 
equally have written equation (1) as 
                                                 
13   This section elaborates upon Felipe and McCombie 2004b.   33
J P ) P / r ( L P ) P / w Π W PV V I I
n
c c
n n n n + ( ￿ß + ￿ß ￿ß , where  c P  and  I P  are the 
consumer price index and the investment deflator, respectively. But it should be 
obvious that this does alter our derivation and arguments:  c P  and  I P  ultimately 
cancel; or, if one prefers, one can carry out the derivation in real terms as 
J ) P / P )( P / r ( L ) P / P )( P / w ( V I I
n
c c
w + ￿ß , that is, with the relative price term. 
 
Let us return now to Denison and elaborate upon what we believe he meant mean 
in the quotation above. We think Denison’s arguments are somewhat obscure and require 
some elucidation. Our interpretation is that Denison has chosen an unusual way to 
consider the identity at constant prices. We infer that he treats the wage and the profit rate 
in the same way as the price of goods and services, so that when he constructs the 
constant-price identity he holds the wage rate and the rate of profit constant at their initial 
base-year values, as opposed to using deflated values (i.e., the nominal value in period 1 
divided by the price deflator in period 1). Consequently, Denison’s identity in the base 
period 0 (in current and constant prices which in this period are the same), is given by: 
 
∑ ≡ + ≡ ≡






0 Q p J r L w ) D ( V ) D ( V    (45) 
 
where (D) denotes our interpretation of Denison’s definition of the identity. (This is the 
same as the conventional identity in period 0.) 
0 i p is the base-period value of the ith good 
(Qi). 
n
0 w  and 
n
0 r  are the wages and the rate of return in period 0 at period 0 prices. 
However, Denison’s definition, holding wages and the rate of profit constant at period 0 
values, does not lead to an identity in constant prices in period 1: 
    
∑ ≠ + ≡




0 1 Q p J r L w ) D ( V      (46)   
 
where the subscripts 0 and 1 represent the values in that period and V1(D) is Denison’s 
constant-price measure of value added at base year prices.  
 
The conventional identity in constant prices in period 1 is given by:  
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 is the value-added deflator that converts current product prices in period 1 to 
prices at period 0.  With technical progress, in all plausible cases,  1
n
1 P / w > 
n
0 w , i.e., the 
deflated value of the nominal wage in period 1 will exceed the value of the nominal wage 
in the base period. 
 
At the expense of laboring the obvious, as there are no independent deflators for 
wages and the rate of profit, the standard procedure is to deflate both sides of the identity 
by the value-added deflator.
14 If we were using the definition for value added on the 
expenditure side, then consumption and investment would be deflated by their own 
deflators, a weighted average which would equal the value-added deflator. This does not 
affect the argument, as whatever deflation procedure is chosen, the left and right side of 
the equation must be equal in constant prices. 
 
Some support is provided for our interpretation by Denison’s statement, noted 
above, that “productivity change is precisely a measure of the degree to which the identity 
does not hold”. Expressing equation (46) in growth rates, we get, with a little 
manipulation, an expression for TFP growth as:  
 
0 J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a ) D ( V ˆ = − − −      (48)   
 
which is compatible with Denison’s argument that this holds only if “one abolishes the 
concept of productivity change.”  
 
However, the usual definition of TFP growth from equation (47) is 
r ˆ ) a 1 ( w ˆ a J ˆ ) a 1 ( L ˆ a V ˆ tfp − + ≡ − − − ≡ . Comparing this with equation (48) it can be 
seen that total factor productivity growth is precisely a measure of the degree to which 
Denison’s identity does not hold, as Denison himself noted. 
 
                                                 
14    The studies by Samuelson (1979), Simon (1979a, 1979b), Barro (1999) and Hulten 
(2000), and the recent paper by Fernald and Neiman (2003) explicitly use the identity in constant 
prices.   35
Moreover, Denison quotes Jorgenson and Griliches (1972, p.79) in a footnote 
where he quotes the latter as defining total factor productivity “as the ratio of real product 
to real factor input, or equivalently, as the ratio of the price of factor input to the product 
price” (Denison 1972b, p.100, footnote 11, italics Denison’s). Denison continues in this 
footnote that  
 
the italicized portion may have been have been included to protect their 
assertion of an identity;  their discussion on page 82, where they say 
productivity is equal to the difference between changes in the prices of 
output and input, each multiplied by the corresponding quantity, supports 
this inference. Viewing the ratio as the difference in the price movements 
of input and output would make the identity hold in constant prices by 
making the input definitionally equal to output, that is by measuring inputs 
over time as the product of their quantities and marginal products. This is 
the definition they have consistently denied using. (Italics in the original.) 
 
  As indicated above, we believe that there is some ambiguity in the discussion, as 
Denison does not explicitly mention how the inputs are to be weighted. Hence the 
argument requires some interpretation. Assuming, for example, a Cobb-Douglas 
production function (setting the constant term to unity), the ratio of real output to real 















, while the ratio of the price of factor input to the 
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−    (49) 
 
  It follows that: 
 








1 1 J r L w J L ) r ( ) w ( V + ≡ ≡
− −    (50) 
 
                                                 
15   Strictly speaking, because the value of TFP alters as the units of measurement change, it 
is only useful to discuss indices or growth rates of TFP.   36
Nevertheless, Denison seems to repeat his earlier mistaken criticism (Denison 
1961) of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), which they had answered in footnote 1 on page 
254 of their paper.  
 
We infer from Denison’s argument in the last part of the quotation above that he 
erroneously suggests that Jorgenson and Griliches effectively get rid of the residual by the 
expedient of defining the growth of the labor and capital input as ( ) L ˆ w ˆ +  and ( ) J ˆ r ˆ + .  
In other words, Denison argues Jorgensen and Griliches define the input of a factor as its 
quantity multiplied by its marginal product, so that the growth of the input is the growth 
of the quantity plus the rate of change of its marginal product. It is difficult to see any 
justification for this erroneous interpretation of Jorgenson and Griliches’s methodology, 
but it is not easy to see how else to interpret Denison.
16 
 
Consequently, Denison’s assertion that the identity cannot hold in constant 
prices, while correct in his own terms, has no relevance for either the growth accounting 




In this paper we have examined two issues relating to Felipe and McCombie’s critique on 
the estimation of production function with value data (i.e., aggregate production 
functions), namely, that the value added identity can be rewritten as a form that resembles 
an aggregate production function, with the consequence that econometric estimation of 
the latter is a pointless exercise. The first question is to what extent the critique is affected 
by, or depends on, the distinction between the notions of rental price of capital and profit 
rate. The second issue is whether or not the income accounting identity holds in constant 
prices. 
 
                                                 
16   Jorgenson (1995, chapter 4) reproduces the exchange with Denison. Jorgenson added a 
final section entitled “Final Reply” which serves as a reply to Denison’s (1972b) “Final 
Comments”. However, Denison’s seemingly fundamental criticism that the income accounting 
identity does not hold in constant prices is not even mentioned. Moreover, Jorgenson argues: 
“…his [Denison’s] accompanying “Final Comments” do not really advance the discussion of the 
methods of measuring total factor productivity further” (Jorgenson 1995, p.169).   37
We conclude that the conceptual difference between profit rate and rental price of capital 
does not affect our argument. The notion of profit rate includes both what neoclassical 
economics refers to as the rental price of capital and any monopolistic profits, should 
these exist. This was further confirmed by discussing Hall’s (1988) influential paper 
where he sought to estimate the mark-up due to market power. We have demonstrated 
theoretically why Hall’s attempt to estimate the mark-up is flawed. It has also been shown 
that Denison’s claim that the underlying identity in constant prices does not exist, while 
correct in terms of his own definition of an identity, does not invalidate our argument as 
has been claimed. 
 
  We remain convinced that that estimating production functions with value data 
does not tell us anything about the underlying technology of the economy and hence the 
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